

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 05073 01 OF 02 311703Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----061476 311707Z /45  
Z R 311607Z MAR 78 ZFF 4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4701  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 05073

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO PRESIDENTIAL PARTY FOR SECRETARY  
VANCE

DEPARTMENT FOR TARNOFF

BONN FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: NATO, GW  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

TO SECRETARY FROM CHRISTOPHER. SUMMARY: CONSIDERING  
THE CIRCUMSTANCES, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TOOK THE ERW  
MESSAGE RELATIVELY CALMLY. HE WAS AT PAINS TO POINT  
OUT THE STEPS TAKEN BY FRG TO ENABLE US TO CARRY OUT  
AN ANTICIPATED POSITIVE DECISION ON PRODUCTION. YET,  
GIVEN PRESIDENT'S STRONG INCLINATION, HE NOW APPEARS  
PREPARED TO HELP US IMPLEMENT A NEGATIVE DECISION.  
HE WILL FACE SIZABLE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH  
THE ANTICIPATED DECISION, AND URGES THAT WE SCHEDULE  
NAC AND US ANNOUNCEMENT AFTER GENSCHER'S VISIT TO US  
NEXT TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY. AT THE END OF THE TWO  
HOUR MEETING AT HIS RESIDENCE IN HAMBURG, HE WAS IN  
A MUCH BETTER MOOD THEN IN THE EARLY PORTION. END  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 05073 01 OF 02 311703Z

SUMMARY.

1. WHEN VEST, STOESSEL, AND I MET WITH SCHMIDT IN  
HAMBURG AT 11 A.M. TODAY, I IMMEDIATELY ADDRESSED THE  
ERW TOPIC. I OUTLINED PRESIDENT'S VIEWS ALONG SAME  
LINES AS MY PRESENTATION YESTERDAY TO GENSCHER.

2. IT WAS GOOD, SCHMIDT SAID, THAT I HAD BRIEFED GENSCHER YESTERDAY BECAUSE IT HAD FOREWARNED HIM. BUT, HAVING HAD ONLY 12 HOURS TO PONDER THE MESSAGE I BROUGHT, HE WOULD HAVE ONLY QUESTIONS AND "PROVISIONAL" REMARKS. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DECISION, HE WOULD NOT QUESTION THE PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT, FOR THE DECISION WAS HIS ALONE TO TAKE. HE WILL CALL A FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING MONDAY OR TUESDAY, AND GENSCHER WILL BRING THEIR MORE MATURED REACTION ON MODALITIES WHEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON NEXT TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY. HE ASKED THAT ANY ANNOUNCEMENT BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER GENSCHER'S VISIT SO THAT HE COULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE TEXT.

3. SCHMIDT THEN COMMENCED A REVIEW OF THE US-FRG CONSULTATION PRIOR TO MARCH 20. HE WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS FULLY CONSCIOUS THAT THE FRG HAD TOTALLY AGREED WITH THE US ON SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURES PRIOR TO MARCH 20, AND HAD WORKED HARD TO PERSUADE OTHERS IN GERMANY AND ELSEWHERE OF THE VALIDITY OF OUR THREE-STEP APPROACH, INCLUDING ULTIMATE ERW DEPLOYMENT ON FRG SOIL. HE COULD NOT HIDE HIS ASTONISHMENT AT THE TURN OF EVENTS THAT HAD OCCASIONED MY TRIP. BUT HE DID NOT LABOR THE POINT UNDULY, AND THE MOMENT PASSED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LONDON 05073 01 OF 02 311703Z

4. REFERRING TO MY REMARKS ABOUT POTENTIAL DIVISIVENESS IN THE ALLIANCE, HE ASKED WHICH COUNTRIES HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT A DECISION TO PRODUCE. WHEN I MENTIONED NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, DENMARK, AND BELGIUM, HE WAS SURPRISED ABOUT BELGIUM. WHEN HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED, I SAID WE DID NOT PUT GERMANY AMONG THAT GROUP. ON MY POINT OF A WIDE DIVISION OF PUBLIC OPINION IN NATO COUNTRIES, I SAID IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION THAT THERE WAS SUCH A DIVISION IN THE US. AS FOR GERMANY, HE SAID SOME MAY WELCOME A NEGATIVE DECISION, BUT NOT THE MAJORITY.

5. SCHMIDT THEN DIVERTED TO A STATEMENT ON THE DANGERS OF SALT FOR THE SECURITY OF EUROPE, ESPECIALLY THE LIMITATIONS IN THE PROTOCOL ON CRUISE MISSILES AND THE POTENTIAL OF THE BACKFIRE BOMBER. BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIETS ARE GETTING AN EDGE IN THEATER AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS, HE HAD WELCOMED THE ATTEMPT TO USE THE ERW AS A BARGAINING CHIP AGAINST THE SS-20, OR PREFERABLY,

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 LONDON 05073 02 OF 02 311703Z  
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----061456 311706Z /45  
Z R 311607Z MAR 78 ZFF 4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4702  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 05073

EXDIS AS NODIS

THE SOVIETS' TANKS. BUT IT WAS NOT TO BE, AND HE  
ACCEPTS THE PRESIDENT'S PROBABLE DECISION.

6. WHEN I ASKED HIS ADVICE ON WHETHER A NEGATIVE ERW  
DECISION COULD BE USED NOT AS A SPECIFIC BARGAINING  
CHIP BUT AS A GENERAL FACTOR TO INFLUENCE SOVIET  
BEHAVIOR, SCHMIDT ANSWERED WITH A QUESTION: WHAT  
DID YOU GET OUT OF THE B-1 DECISION? HE DID AGREE  
THAT A NEGATIVE ERW DECISION WOULD DEPRIVE THE SOVIETS  
OF A PROPAGANDA PLOY, AND ENABLE US TO FOCUS ON THEIR  
TRUE ARMS CONTROL STANCE, BUT THOUGHT THIS WOULD  
BE A FLEETING ADVANTAGE.

7. THESE POINTS NOW OFF HIS CHEST, SCHMIDT TURNED TO  
THE QUESTION OF HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE DECISION,  
MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (A) THE DECISION IS  
AND SHOULD BE PRESENTED AS A SOVEREIGN DECISION  
TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT; (B) IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO  
ALLOW CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL DIVISIVENESS IN THE  
ALLIANCE OVER A POSITIVE DECISION TO FLOW INTO THE  
ANNOUNCEMENT; (C) HE IS DOUBTFUL THAT THERE SHOULD  
BE ANY REFERENCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO A DIVIDED  
PUBLIC OPINION; (D) THERE SHOULD BE A NAC MEETING JUST  
BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THOUGH HE ACCEPTS THE  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 05073 02 OF 02 311703Z

DESIRABILITY OF PRIOR TELEGRAPHIC NOTIFICATION TO  
NATO CAPITALS.

8. HE STRONGLY URGES THAT ANNOUNCEMENT BE DELAYED  
UNTIL GENSCHER CAN COME TO WASHINGTON TO CONSULT WITH  
US ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT. HE WILL TRY TO ADVANCE  
GENSCHER'S DEPARTURE SO HE CAN ARRIVE LATE TUESDAY.  
HIS EMPHASIS ON THIS POINT INDICATES THAT HE WANTS  
GENSCHER'S PHYSICAL AS WELL AS INTELLECTUAL INVOLVE-  
MENT.

9. BY THE END OF THE MEETING, THE MOOD HAD CHANGED  
MARKEDLY. HE WAS ANTICIPATING WITH PLEASURE THE  
PRESIDENT'S TRIP, AND SHOWING ME MOMENTOS IN HIS BAR  
OF CALIFORNIA, THE FLORIDA KEYS, AND TEXAS. STOESSEL  
WILL BE REPORTING ON THE OTHER TOPICS WHICH AROSE IN  
THE WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION, AS WELL AS HIS EVALUATION  
OF SCHMIDT'S REACTION, WHICH HE FOUND REASSURING.

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## Message Attributes

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**Concepts:** MEETINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MEETING REPORTS, CAT-B  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 31 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978LONDON05073  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS, DEPART PASS TO PRESIDENTIAL PARTY FOR SEC VANCE, BONN FOR THE AMB  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS, EXDIS  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3246155  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT  
**TAGS:** PARM, MNUC, GE, US, NATO, (SCHMIDT, HELMUT)  
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**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014